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US Landpower in Regional Focus

Regionally Aligned Forces:
Business Not as Usual
Kimberly Field, James Learmont, and Jason Charland
Abstract: Few understand the rationale or components of the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept. This article describes the
concept and addresses its chief criticisms, namely, how it will account for diverse ground force requirements, how it relates to the
Army’s force structure, and its affordability.

T

he term Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) is widely familiar today;
however, few understand the basic elements of the concept,
or the goals the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General
Raymond T. Odierno, wants to achieve with it. Officers in HQDA have
been on the road communicating the RAF concept to as broad an audience as possible. But the concept has drawn its share of skeptics. The
most common questions fall into three broad categories: 1) Regional
alignment for what? What are the ground force requirements for today?
What is the real demand? 2) Isn’t this just a way for the Army to justify
force structure? Is the Army really doing anything differently? 3) Is the
RAF even affordable? Won’t it “collapse under its own weight” due to
our extraordinary fiscal challenges? This article addresses each of these
broad questions and presents the basic concept and rationale for RAF.

Why RAF?

At its core, RAF is the CSA’s initiative for aligning Army capabilities to an expanded set of requirements for the Joint Force—post-2014.
As General Odierno stated at the Association of United States Army
Eisenhower Dinner in October 2012, we will leverage the Army’s
mission command capability by “organizing our missions around highly
trained squads and platoons—the foundation for our company, battalion, and brigade combat teams—for specific mission sets and regional
conditions.” This “regional alignment of forces” will not only offer combatant commanders access to the full range of capabilities resident in the
Army today, it will “provide maximum flexibility and agility to national
security decision-makers.”1
RAF is a critical first step in operationalizing the concept of
“Strategic Landpower,” which is the combination of land, human, and
cyber activities that make decisive outcomes more likely, and increases

1     General Raymond T. Odierno, “Regionally Aligned forces: A New Model for Building
Partnerships,” Army Live, March 22, 2012, http://armylive.dodlive.mil/index.php/2012/03/
aligned-forces/; General Raymond T. Odierno, CSA’s Strategic Intent, February 5, 2013, http://www.
army.mil/article/95729/
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options for preventing and containing conflict.2 RAF is integral to the
Army vision of being “Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged”
and it is fundamental to our ability to “Prevent, Shape and Win” across
the globe. It is essential to the US defense strategy and represents the
Army’s commitment to provide culturally attuned, scalable, missionprepared capabilities in a changing strategic environment characterized
by combinations of nontraditional and traditional threats.
Army Regionally Aligned Forces are defined as 1) those units assigned
to or allocated to combatant commands, and 2) those service-retained
capabilities aligned with combatant commands and prepared by the Army
for regional missions. They are drawn from the Total Force, which
includes the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army
Reserve. They consist of organizations and capabilities that are: forward
stationed; operating in a combatant command area of responsibility;
supporting (or ready to support) combatant commands through reachback capabilities from outside the area of responsibility. They conduct
operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises, and
theater security cooperation activities. RAF specifically addresses those
requirements that are enduring in nature for the combatant commander,
from “set-the-theater” to the most-likely contingencies. Accomplishing
such regional missions requires an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where RAF are most
likely to be employed, as well as expertise in how to impart military
knowledge and skills to others. Hence, much of the Army is and remains
aligned by virtue of assignment or allocation to a combatant commander.
In contrast, Global Response Forces (GRFs) are the designated
Joint GRF that maintains a 24/7 global mission to deploy anywhere in
the world within 18 hours, as well as the other service retained units that
are required to stay intact and at a high states of readiness. The Army
will also provide a strategic forcible-entry package, as well as some of the
other capabilities that are low density but required for the initial weeks
of a limited or no-notice high intensity contingency operation.3
The RAF concept provides numerous benefits. Strategically, it offers
the United States both influence in and access to host nations through
enhanced trust and understanding facilitated by enduring engagements.
Operationally, it enables better integration between conventional Army
forces and special operating forces, as well as between the Army and
interagency partners, specifically the Department of State and Country
Teams.
In a sense, RAF means “forces—military and nonmilitary—with not
only the ability to destroy but also the decisive ability to understand the
population within the context of the operational environment and then
take meaningful action to influence human behavior toward achieving
2     Additionally, the Army’s fiscal year 2013 Strategic Planning Guidance says the future force will
provide regionally aligned, mission tailored forces scalable in size from squad to corps. Its personnel
are to be empowered by technology and training to execute operations under the concept of mission
command, underpinned by trust, flexibility, and proficiency. The operating force will, thus, comprise
forces both regionally aligned in support of combatant command and those maintaining a global
orientation for specific contingency missions. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Strategic
Planning Guidance, 2013, 6.
3     Brigadier General Charles Flynn and Major Joshua Richardson, “Joint Operational Access and
the Global Response Force, Redefining Readiness,” Military Review, July-August 2013.
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the desired outcome.”4 At the tactical level, RAF drives cultural and
regional expertise and language awareness training giving US forces an
improved understanding of the operational environment. As a result,
combatant commands receive units better prepared to work in specific
theaters and better able to gain situational understanding when deployed
anywhere, even to a region to which they are not aligned. It also fosters
an expeditionary mindset for an Army that is more CONUS-based than
ever, while also affording a greater degree of mission predictability and
stability.
For nearly a decade, the Army had to respond to combatant command
requirements, outside Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring
Freedom, with personnel from the Total Force who were sometimes
minimally prepared. As we reduce our commitment to Afghanistan and
United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), regional alignment
will improve the Army’s ability to generate strategically, operationally,
and tactically relevant forces for the geographic combatant commands
on a broader basis.
With the recent availability of forces returning from the CENTCOM
area of responsibility and the Army’s commitment to provide whatever
the geographic combatant commands request, the demand for Army
forces is both significant and diverse. This demand appears in the
increased requirements registered in the FY14-19 Program Objective
Memorandum. The activities range from military police assistance in
Africa to an increase in State Partnership activities in South America,
to preparing the American contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Reaction Force, to returning Pacific Command’s aligned
forces to its most likely contingency operations.
Currently, America’s Army has more than 158,000 soldiers deployed
or assigned overseas, with a substantial number engaged in stability
operations in Afghanistan or executing missions in Korea, Kosovo,
the Sinai, Guantanamo, the Horn of Africa, Honduras, and other locations around the globe. Even after the drawdown in Afghanistan, on
any given day the Army will typically have at least 100,000 soldiers
forward deployed. Land forces will continue to be the most engaged
and employed of the Joint team, and through constant engagement and
assessing the effectiveness of activities on the ground among humans,
will be well positioned to continue to evolve direct and indirect options
for the use of the military instrument for policymakers.

Regional Alignment for What?

The Defense Strategic Guidance of 2012 defined a new strategic
direction for the Department of Defense, assigning the Joint Force the
mission of addressing myriad complex threats in uncertain operational
environments. The Army will not be sized for the types of operations
it conducted in the last decade. The defense guidance further directed a
rebalance to the Asia-Pacific Theater, while also giving high priority to
the Middle East and to other partners and friends around the world. It
directed that the Joint Force must be capable of performing 11 primary
missions, but left it to the services to determine how:
4     Charles L. Cleveland and Stewart T. Farris, “Toward Strategic Landpower,” Army Magazine,
July 2013, 22.
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•• Counterterrorism and irregular warfare
•• Deter and defeat aggression
•• Project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges
•• Counter weapons of mass destruction
•• Operate effectively in cyberspace
•• Operate effectively in space
•• Maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent
•• Defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities
•• Provide a stabilizing presence
•• Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations
•• Conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations
The defense guidance clearly implied that the “old ways” of conducting these missions were no longer suitable, either operationally or fiscally.
Most of us agree the present era is one of persistent conflict and instability. The strategic and operational environments are driving the United
States and its allies and friends toward an emphasis on “shaping missions” in unstable regions in addition to preparing for existential threats.
We anticipate an expanding range of smaller, shorter, rapidly changing
missions. These new requirements are compelling the Joint Force and
the Army toward superior agility; expanded expeditionary capabilities;
precise lethality; enhanced cultural awareness and people savvy; as well
as a better ability to integrate with special operations forces and other
agencies. Importantly, the concept of partnering with other countries
and building the capacity of others is both inherent and explicit in this
new paradigm.
The bottom line is the Army, as part of the joint force and in conjunction with foreign partners, must respond to the requirements of
the combatant commanders which are those the defense guidance missions outlined. At the same time, it must ensure it can mass to conduct
any high-end combat mission anywhere. Accordingly, the evolution of
the RAF concept has been grounded in a number of critical principles
driven by the operational and fiscal environment, defense guidance, and
as expressed by the CSA:
•• The Army, together with the Marines and the United States Special
Operations Command, will continue to develop the concept of
Strategic Landpower.
•• The Army will remain capable of fighting and winning major combat
operations.
•• While maintaining a modular, brigade-centric structure, the Army
will increase its agility through leader development at all levels, and
world-class training, to include enhanced Combat Training Center
rotations for as many brigades as possible.
•• The reduction of forces will be conducted in a way that does not
break faith with soldiers and Army civilians and their families and
that maintains the most ready force possible to meet Combatant
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Commander needs.
•• Tough choices will have to be made regarding roles of Active and
Reserve components in accordance with defense missions, but the
Reserve Component will remain an essential part of the Total Army.
•• With the redistribution of United States forces stationed overseas, the
Army will be almost entirely based in the continental United States for
the first time in many generations.
Embracing these principles will help offset the turbulence of today’s
strategic environment and underpin the development and execution of
Regionally Aligned Forces. Over the past decade, the Army conducted
both combat and counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
We need to retain the knowledge and skills gained in those conflicts, and
yet prepare for the broader range of requirements of the future environment under severe fiscal constraints. This is an incredible challenge, yet
the current operating environment demands it.

Is the Army Really Doing Anything Differently?

Regional alignment is a fundamentally different orientation for the
Army. As the Army further defines the concept of Strategic Landpower,
RAF begins to provide for, organize, man, train, and equip operations
and activities in the land, human, and cyber “domains.” Rather than
coming home from Iraq and Afghanistan to focus on training as the
Army sees fit, our first priority is to understand the requirements of geographic combatant commands and to prepare forces for those activities.
In addition to its decisive action training, an aligned unit is now preparing with an eye to the region to which it is focused. More forces will
be assigned, allocated, and service-retained-combatant-commanderaligned than ever before for nonwartime missions: this is unprecedented
for the Army. And, significantly, every geographic combatant command
will have at least one brigade, as well as a division or corps headquarters
with all the capabilities it provides.
Does this justify force structure? Certainly. These requirements,
which will be dispersed with potentially degraded readiness over time,
are both real and in addition to those associated with major contingency
operations. But RAF is most centrally about an Army that is committed
to meeting geographic combatant command needs, thereby retaining
and refining its relevance in a changing operational environment.

RAF in Execution
Alignment of Service

Retained forces will provide unit training and education focus
(predictable preparation), and these units will be the first called on
if a combatant commander needs more personnel and capabilities
than assigned or allocated forces can provide (predictable sourcing).
Habitual alignment (lasting longer than one Army Force Generation
[ARFORGEN] cycle) will occur at Echelon above Brigade (corps and
division levels) and we are considering all options in the Global Force
Management Implementation Guidance for FY15. Full habitual alignment will likely be achieved in FY17. While it is desirable to maintain
habitual alignment at brigade combat team level, the realities of current
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defense missions makes this aspirational rather than practicable. As a
result, service-retained, combatant-command-aligned forces will rotate
annually in accordance with the ARFORGEN process. Alignment is
occurring under United States Army Forces Command’s FY13/14
Mission Alignment Order (MAO). The FY15 MAO will increase global
alignments, made possible largely because of the drawdown in Central
Command’s area of responsibility.
•• Corps. For FY13, I Corps is assigned to Pacific Command, III Corps
is allocated to Central Command, and the XVIII Airborne Corps is
Service retained but aligned to the Global Response Force. These
alignments will endure. Formalizing the relationship between corps
and ASCCs and tethered brigade combat teams is subject to ongoing
work from US Army Training and Doctrine Command.
•• Division. Active component division HQs with their separate brigades
will be habitually aligned to provide at least one Joint Force-capable
HQ to each combatant command. This is perhaps the most important
capability the Army is providing to geographic combatant commands,
as it can access a full range of capabilities from planning to specific
enablers. It is also capable of scaling to provide mission command for
missions of various sizes, tailoring as the situations change. These
headquarters will lean forward to support combatant commanders,
working through the Army Service Component Command, as indicators and warnings of instability emerge. An example of this is the 1st
Armored Division (1AD) as briefly described above. It deployed to
Jordan as part of the joint exercise Eager Lion, having already coordinated with Central Command to understand the worsening crisis
in Syria. From there, a tactical command post remained in Jordan to
assist the Jordanians and other partners with a wide range of activities
resulting from the mass humanitarian crisis to the north.
•• Brigades and enabler units. For FY13, units below division are
assigned, allocated, or service retained, aligned in varying strengths to
geographic combatant commands, and to the Global Response Force.
2-1ID Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), now allocated to the
United States Africa Command, is the first brigade allocated in this
manner. Since March 2013, they have conducted approximately 79
missions in more than 30 countries (as of mid-September 2013).

Training

The Army will adopt a revised ARFORGEN cycle based on a
24-month Active Component and 60-month Reserve Component
sequence. It will cover Reset, Train, Ready (year 1) and Available
(year 2). Training policy is to focus on achieving baseline proficiency
of T1 level through decisive action training, involving unit maneuver
preparation at the Army Combat Training Centers. Fiscal constraints
may limit full implementation of that policy. However, all regionally
aligned forces will be trained, prior to deployment, to the readiness level
required by the combatant commander. Soldiers’ baseline training will
be supplemented, where necessary, by combatant commander-specified
skill acquisition for their assigned missions. This additional training is
subdivided into two components to enhance the US Army’s ability to
work with partners:
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•• Mission-specific training will be articulated by Army Service
Component Commands (based on combatant command requirements) and organized through FORSCOM. Cultural and regional
expertise and language awareness training will be conducted at home
station throughout the training year and the year of availability, and
be supervised by the division/brigade HQs. Other Army institutional
and training capabilities will support as required. The 162nd Infantry
Brigade, now focused on Security Force Assistance (SFA) training,
will provide much of the support in the short-term. Future training
support will come from regionally aligned formation headquarters
and retained advise and assist expertise. As an example, Armored
Brigade Combat Team “Dagger” 1ID soldiers received specialized
language, regional expertise, and cultural training at their home
station in April 2012. This special cultural and regional orientation
was known as “Dagger University.” Using Africa-born forces from
within the brigade, African Studies students from nearby Kansas State
University, and the 162nd Infantry Brigade from Fort Polk, Louisiana,
the week-long training introduced cultural and linguist information
specific to the regions of Africa where the soldiers would most likely
work. Based on insights provided by the Africa-born 2nd ABCT
Soldiers, as well as the Kansas State University African Studies students, Dagger University provided forces the knowledge they needed
to accomplish complex mission sets.

Austere Environments

The Army’s deployment experience over the past 12 years focused on
units deploying into a priority theater and then falling in on established
Forward Operating Bases, some more austere than others, for a set period
of time. As we focus on the challenges of operating around the globe
in support of the national security strategy, which projects more balanced global support, Army units will develop an expeditionary mindset
to ensure they are equipped to train and operate in remote, minimally
supported environments. As a result, personnel should be prepared for
change to what has been the norm in recent years. The deployment cycle
will change from the current 6-12 months with a Brigade formation
to a more cyclic tempo of deployments that will be episodic, lasting
anywhere from one week to several months, and employing units, teams,
and in some cases, individuals. Living conditions and theater-specific
equipment and force protection (FP) measures will all be vastly different
from the norm. The role of the combatant command and Army Service
Component Command in providing basic life support and sustainment
will be critical to the success of these deployments.
As an example, recent events in Mali significantly increased Africa
Command’s requirements for Army support to the Department of State
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)-funded training for partner
nation security forces. Army Regionally Aligned Forces from 1-18 IN
deployed a 22-person multifunctional training team to Oullam, Niger,
on 27 May 2013 to help mentor and train a Nigerian Defense Force for
deployment to Mali as part of the African-led International Support
Mission to Mali missions. Through interagency collaboration with the
Chief of Mission and the Department of State, US Army personnel
were accompanied by seven PAE contractors to execute the training
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mission. As a multinational dimension, French Army trainers provided
tailored training on certain military capabilities; specifically artillery
systems. Both the scale (22 people) and the duration (about 10 weeks)
of the deployment are indicative of the new operating environment that
confronts combatant commands. While conditions on the ground were
austere and reflected the harsh nature of the environment, this mission
proved popular as junior leaders were empowered to command. The
relative short duration of the mission was popular with a cohort that
has grown used to, and weary of, 12-month deployments. For many, the
fact that they are operating in a different country with unique cultural
characteristics and fresh challenges has energized them and provided a
much needed operational and training focus.

Is the RAF Affordable?

Given these extraordinary fiscal times, the question of affordability
is a good one and the Army continues to balance requirements inside
its Operations and Maintenance (O&M) budget with most likely and
most dangerous missions. While the institution has seen an increase in
demand from combatant commanders, much of this demand is paid for
by other parties. But there is no real possibility of it “collapsing under
its own weight.” Already in the first year of regionally aligned forces
execution, the Army has realized numerous efficiencies by being able to
identify when to send squads rather than platoons. This agility will only
increase over time.
Some of the direct costs associated with RAF are based on future
training strategy, which includes readiness, language training, and the
future viability of some training platforms. Costs linked to the actual
implementation of regional alignment mostly will come from Title 22,
Combatant Commander funds, joint exercise funds, and special authorities, such as the Global Security Contingency Fund. In fact, the initial
alignment of 2/1 infantry brigade demonstrated that there are authorities and funding available for more effective and efficient alignment
of execution capabilities. With regard to the use of regionally aligned
forces in the traditional Title 10 sense where the Army foots the bill,
HQDA has noted a 25 percent increase in the FY15 Program Objective
Memorandum for security cooperation activities. Some of this is due to
the increased availability of US forces to assist combatant commanders for their Theater Campaign Plans. This will require financial offset
from elsewhere within the Army budget and the Army is analyzing the
feasibility of this.
Nonetheless, the services—the Army especially—have to make
tough choices in readying forces for a full range of military operations,
from humanitarian assistance in the Pacific, to the crisis response requirements of “new normal” in Northern Africa, to major combat operations
in the Middle East or North Korea. The Army has to be ready for each
of these missions, yet it stays busy every day with keeping theaters set
with intelligence, communications, and logistics architecture, supporting counterterrorism activities, and with military engagement with
partners across the globe. The funding for both the readiness and some
of the activity itself comes from the Army’s top line, its Operations and
Maintenance dollars. Balancing readiness for the most likely and most
dangerous courses of action has never been more difficult. Meeting
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combatant commanders’ specific day-to-day needs potentially requires
a lower level of collective training than do major combat operations, yet
those same forces must be ready for the toughest fight, particularly as
the total number available for that fight decreases.

Conclusion: Business Not as Usual

Regional alignment will take approximately five years to implement
fully. The effects of the reduced budget and the pace of drawdown of
US forces from Afghanistan are the key constraints to quicker progress. However, as the concept matures through FY14, the Army’s focus
on regional alignment will increase across all combatant commands,
to include increasing support to and integration with US Special
Operations Command. For soldiers, RAF means real-world missions
in exciting places. For policymakers and strategists, RAF means a more
agile, responsive, integrated Army. To combatant commanders, RAF
means many of the Army’s capabilities in the continental United States
have, in effect, become a part of their areas of responsibility. And for
America’s role as a global leader, RAF offers a very real mechanism to
shape the operational environment, on the land and among humans,
more consistently and in conjunction with a range of strategic partners.
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